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STATEMENT OF PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS 
This Court should be aware that Ms. Tanner's coworker, Jeffrey Record, who was 
implicated in the same wrong-doing for which she was terminated, has also filed an 
appeal of the Workforce Appeals Board's decision to deny her unemployment benefits, 
Case No. 20100719-CA. As the facts and issues raised in these appeals are very similar, 
the Court should consider them together. 
STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
103(2)(a) because this is an appeal from a decision of an administrative agency. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Should the Board have allowed the photographs to be introduced as new 
evidence in Ms. Tanner's appeal of the Administrative Law Judge's decision? 
Proper application of the Employment Security Act and the relevant rules is 
reviewed with "only moderate deference." Ekshteyn v. DWS, 2002 UT App. 74. 
This issue was the basis for Ms. Tanner's Appeal of ALJ Decision. R. 127-137. 
2. Should the decision of the ALJ be reversed based on the photographic 
evidence introduced? 
The Court will reverse an administrative agency's findings of fact "only if the 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Rowley v. DWS, WAB, 2009 UT App 
371. 
This issue was the basis for Ms. Tanner's Appeal of ALJ Decision. R. 127-137. 
5 
3. Should the case be remanded for a new hearing to consider the 
photographic evidence? 
Proper application of the Employment Security Act and the relevant rules is 
reviewed with "only moderate deference." Ekshteyn v. DWS, 2002 UT App. 74. 
Remand was proposed as an option to reversal in Ms. Tanner's Appeal of ALJ 
Decision. R. 131. 
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
Resolution of this case necessarily involves application of Utah Code Ann. § 63 G-
4-403(4), which provides as follows: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been 
substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
* # # 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or 
decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
* * * 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by 
statute; 
* * * 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Appeals Board of the Utah Department of 
Workforce Services denying benefits to the Claimant, Emilie Tanner. Ms. Tanner 
worked for Zions Bank for 17 years. The basis for Ms. Tanner's termination is that one 
of her coworkers, Brandy Hanson, claimed to have seen her unclothed in a file room with 
another Zions employee, Jeffrey Record, on Friday, February 19, 2010. It is undisputed 
that the only first-hand witnesses to what happened in the file room are Mr. Record, Ms. 
Tanner, and Ms. Hanson. It is also undisputed that the file room door is always open, and 
was open on the occasion at issue, and that there are security lights in the room that are 
always on. Both Ms. Tanner and Mr. Record testified that they engaged in a work-related 
discussion while Ms. Tanner was taking a break in the file room, which did every day, 
and that they were not engaged in any improper conduct or even touching when they 
spoke. Ms. Hanson, however, testified that she stood in the doorway of the file room to 
blow her nose, and saw Mr. Record and Ms. Tanner pulling on their clothes. 
It is undisputed that Zions' EVP, David Hinds, met with Ms. Tanner on February 
19, and asked her if it was inappropriate for her to be in a dark room with a coworker (the 
parties dispute whether Ms. Tanner responded that it was or was not inappropriate). It is 
also undisputed that Deborah Battista terminated Ms. Tanner on Monday, February 22, 
2010, without ever telling her that she was alleged to have been undressed in the file 
room with Mr. Record, and obviously without giving her the opportunity to rebut the 
allegations. 
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During the unemployment hearing in this case, the visibility through the shelving 
of the room became an issue. It is undisputed that Mr. Record and Ms. Tanner were in 
the back corner of the file room during the incident in question. Two other Zions' 
witnesses, Deborah Battista and David Hinds, testified that one could see clearly from the 
doorway of the file room to the back corner where it is undisputed that Mr. Record and 
Ms. Tanner were when Ms. Hanson entered the room. In her examination of Ms. 
Hanson, Ms. Tanner elicited testimony regarding the shelving in the room and the layout, 
but Ms. Hanson insisted that she could see Ms. Tanner and Mr. Record clearly to see who 
they were and what they were doing. Ultimately, the ALJ denied Ms. Tanner 
unemployment benefits, determining that Zions' witnesses were more credible than she 
and Mr. Record were. 
To establish that an employee was discharged for just cause and not entitled to 
unemployment insurance benefits, Employers bear the burden of showing: 1) the 
employee was culpable, meaning the that the employees conduct was so serious that 
continuing the employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful 
interest; 2) the employee had knowledge of the conduct the employer expected; and 3) 
the employees conduct causing the discharge was within the employees control. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 35A-4-405(2)(a); Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202(l)-(3). The ALJ ruled 
that Respondent Zions had carried its burden regarding its action to fire the Claimant for 
just cause, finding that Ms. Tanner had indeed been undressed in the file room with Mr. 
Record. Ms. Tanner appealed this decision to the Workforce Appeals Board. 
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After the hearing, Ms. Tanner was able to gain access to the file room to take 
photographs of it, pursuant to a demand by her attorney as part of a defamation case she 
filed against Ms. Hanson. R 132-135. The photographs show the extent to which the 
shelving blocks the view of the back of the room. R. 135. In fact, one of the photographs 
was taken while Mr. Record sat where he was sitting when Ms. Hanson walked in the 
room, but he is not visible in the photograph. R. 132-135. In her Appeal of ALJ 
Decision, Ms. Tanner submitted the photograph and requested that the Board review it as 
new evidence, and remand the case to the ALJ or reverse the decision. She argued that 
the photograph showed that Ms. Hanson could not have seen what she claimed to have 
seen, and that Ms. Battista and Mr. Hinds were lying about the visibility in the room. 
The Board declined to accept the photographs as evidence, and additionally, ruled that 
even if they had been accepted, they would not change the outcome of the case. R. 139-
148. 
Ms. Tanner hereby appeals the Board's decision not to allow the photographs as 
additional evidence. She also appeals the Board's determination that the photographs 
would not change the decision denying her benefits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Ms. Tanner was terminated from her job with Zions Bank on or about Monday, 
February 22, 2010. R. 6. She had worked for Zions for over 17 years, most 
recently as a Lending Supervisor. R. 6. 
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Ms. Tanner's co-worker, Jeffrey Record, was terminated on the same day she was. 
R. 48:1-8. 
Zions' position is that on February 19, 2010, employee Brandy Hanson claimed to 
have witnessed Ms. Tanner and Mr. Record partially undressed together in a file 
room, and that this was the basis for Ms. Tanner and Mr. Record's termination. R. 
59:1-19. 
At the time Ms. Tanner was terminated, she was not told that she was alleged to 
have been undressed with Mr. Record in the file room; it was suggested to her that 
it was inappropriate for her to have been in the file room with him, but there was 
no mention of her being unclothed. R. 66:22-35. She was not asked to respond to 
any allegations that she was undressed in the file room. R. 76:17-27. 
To contest Ms. Tanner's unemployment claim, Zions provided the Department of 
Workforce Services ("DWFS") a document signed by Zions employee Brandy 
Hanson, which stated, "On the morning of February 19th 2010 around 9:45 am, I 
went into an empty file room that is no longer in use, to blow my nose when I 
heard a noise, flipped on the light and saw 2 people with their clothes half off in 
the back corner of the room on a chair. I then stood outside of the room, as there 
is only one exit, so I could se who was in there. I waited about 5 minutes when 
Jeff Record came out soon following was Emily Tanner. I then went and reported 
it to my supervisor Brandy DeHerrera." R. 12. 
DWFS denied Ms. Tanner's initial request for unemployment benefits on the 
following basis: "The clmt was discharged for inappropriate behavior with another 
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employee. By having a physical relationship at work with another employee the 
clmt created an uncomfortable work environment for other employers and also 
was not working during work hour." R. 15. 
Ms. Tanner appealed the decision, and a hearing was held. For the hearing, she 
provided a diagram of the file room at issue as part of her unemployment hearing. 
R. 18. The diagram showed a single cart in the back corner of the file room, with 
three sets of shelves between the cart and the doorway. R. 18. The witnesses in 
the hearing testified that the diagram was accurate, other than the offices across 
the hall from the file room. R. 59: 27-32. 
Ms. Battista, Vice President of Talent Management for Zions, testified in hearing 
that in the "summer of '09,1 received two actual complaints about Emilie and Jeff 
Record. It was from our global compliance." R. 45:19-20. She also told the ALJ 
that two people wrote complaints about Ms. Tanner and Mr. Record's relationship. 
R. 50:7-8. She also said that two managers raised the same concerns "in the 
course of me looking into this into September." R. 50:39-44; see also, R. 46:2-4. 
(Under questioning from Ms. Tanner, Ms. Battista stated that actually, there was 
only one complaint when she talked to Ms. Tanner in September, and the other 
complaint came in after the September conversation. R. 54:10-19; 75:5-12.) 
Ms. Battista spoke to Ms. Tanner about the allegations in September 2009, and 
Ms. Tanner denied that there was any inappropriate relationship between her and 
Mr. Record. R. 46:19. Ms. Battista told Ms. Tanner to "manage perceptions" 
regardless of whether the allegations were true. R. 45:17-46:26. 
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10. Ms. Battista testified that there were other complaints about Ms. Tanner, but she 
did not have specific knowledge about the other complaints about her "from the 
affiliates" because Mr. Hinds, Zions' Executive Vice President, had received 
those. R. 54:42-55:12. (Mr. Hinds did not acknowledge receiving any complaints 
himself about Ms. Tanner and/or Mr. Record, but rather, stated that Ms. Battista 
had received the complaints. R. 65:3-5. Mr. Hinds said that his only active 
involvement with complaints about Ms. Tanner was February 19. R. 70:33-38. 
Mr. Hinds testified that he understood that there were complaints that Ms. Tanner 
and Mr. Record met "in his office behind closed doors" and that they had 
"extensive conversations." R. 65:36-38. He stated, however, that he had no 
personal experience of any inappropriate behavior by Ms. Tanner. R. 71:11-14.) 
11. Ms. Battista testified that she spoke to Ms. Tanner again about allegations of an 
improper relationship between her and Mr. Record in November 2009, because the 
acting manager had concerns because Ms. Tanner and Mr. Record were at the 
hospital together visiting supervisor. R. 46:30-47:30. 
12. Ms. Tanner testified that the November conversation did not occur. R. 93:34-44. 
13. Ms. Battista drafted a memorandum documenting Ms. Tanner's termination, in 
which she stated that David Hinds told Ms. Tanner and Mr. Record that "the 
company had spent considerable time and money in addition to formal counseling 
and written probation regarding their consistent inappropriate behavior with each 
other on company time." R. 8. Ms. Battista testified in the hearing that Ms. 
Tanner was not actually subject to formal counseling or written probation. R. 55-
12 
57:2. Mr. Hinds also acknowledged that Ms. Tanner was never put on formal 
written probation. R. 68:14-16. 
14. Mr. Hinds testified that on February 19, 2010, Ms. Hanson told him that she had 
gone into a file room to blow her nose and that she saw Ms. Tanner and Mr. 
Record "back in the corner partially clothed." R. 59:9-19. 
15. Mr. Hinds called Ms. Battista and said, "I have an employee who has witnessed a 
situation that - regarding these two people, and what should I do," and Ms. 
Battista responded that he should take them to the office and take their badges, 
"and don't discuss it too much until we can get our facts." R. 48:1-5. Ms. Battista 
said that "since it was a situation, you know, in a mailroom, dark, and because we 
had coached these two people, and the seriousness of what the witness described 
and what she saw, I just felt it was best to remove both people and then I could 
seek internal counsel... just make sure that we had, you know, all of our ducks in 
a row." R. 51:34-39. 
16. Mr. Hinds testified that he called Ms. Tanner in to talk with her, he asked her if 
she knew why he was talking to her, and she said, "if it's about a conversation that 
I had with Jeff in the file room, then yeah, I know why I'm being called in." R. 
66:24-27. He did not tell her about any allegations that she was undressed in the 
file room, or ask her to respond to any such allegations. R. 66:22-37. 
17. Ms. Battista terminated Ms. Tanner, based on what David Hinds had told her. R. 
51:21-26. By the time she spoke with Ms. Tanner, the decision to terminate her 
had already been made. R. 51:41-44. She never asked Ms. Tanner for her version 
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of what happened in the file room. R. 76:17-27. She testified that she told Ms. 
Tanner "that we had an employee who saw them in the backroom" (R. 48:31-32), 
that "because she was seen in this dark room inappropriately with another 
employee, and that the grounds for termination were because there was a pattern 
and a history; that this was creating a hostile work environment; that she had been 
coached a couple of times" (R. 52:10-13). See also, R. 75:14-21. 
18. Ms. Battista testified that termination was necessary, rather than some lesser form 
of discipline, because "we had several months of complaints from other 
employees," and "there were "two other employees that accused her of having an 
affair with their boyfriends." R. 53:1 -11. Ms. Battista did not provide 
documentation or specifics regarding any of these complaints or allegations. 
19. Ms. Battista testified about the file room at issue as follows: "Well, the door was 
open. It's a large enough room, but there's just a security light that's on the right 
perimeter, so it's not fully lit. When I went in there - when I - when it just has a 
security light, it'd be difficult to [sic] where the two were supposed to have been 
seen. It - you can look back there, but you can kind of see, but, you know, it's 
kind of dim. But when you turn the lights on, you have full view right to the back 
corner." R. 48:43-49:5. 
20. Mr. Hinds testified that the shelves in the room "go from top to bottom." R. 
62:11-13. He understood that when Ms. Hanson was in the file room on February 
19, Mr. Record and Ms. Tanner were in the back corner of the file room "where it 
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says 'Cart'" on the diagram Ms. Tanner submitted. R. 62:18-21. The location of 
the "Cart" was "diagonally from the entryway to that room." R. 63:4-9. 
21. Mr. Hinds testified that from the doorway of the room, he could see Zions' 
representative when he was back in the comer of the room where the cart was. He 
said when the representative was standing up, "I could see your head and your 
face and then I could see your mid-section and your tie between the next layer, and 
then- and then all the way down. So it's pretty clear to see between the shelving 
because the shelving is empty." R. 63:23-27. 
22. Ms. Hanson testified that when she walked into the file room to blow her nose, she 
heard rustling, and that Jeff Record and Ms. Tanner "were in the back corner of 
the room. Jeff was sitting. Emilie was on him, sitting on his lap. And they 
jumped up very quickly as I turned the light on." R. 78:25-35. She said that Jeff 
jumped up and pulled his pants up. R. 78:25-26. She that she "could see their 
faces and the filing cabinet. It's a filing room, so there's parts that are blocked. 
But I saw [bare] legs and I saw faces." R. 78: 37-44. 
23. Ms. Hanson testified that there were boxes on the floor in the room. R. 80:1. 
24. She also testified that the security lights were on in the room. R. 84:15-17. 
25. Ms. Hanson said that she was standing, not bending down, when she was in the 
doorway. R. 86:38-41. 
26. Ms. Hanson said that there were three or four sets of shelves between her and the 
comer where Mr. Record sat, and that she was looking at him at a diagonal angle 
through the shelves. R. 87:4-31. 
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27. Ms. Tanner testified that Mr. Record had asked her a work-related question that 
day as she was going to take a break in the file room where she took her break 
every day. She went in the room to meditate when she was stressed out at work, 
per her therapist's advice. She told Mr. Record that he could come talk to her 
about his question while she was taking a break. He did, and they talked for five 
to seven minutes, and then someone came in and turned on the overhead light. 
Mr. Record started to leave, but because the person left, they continued their 
conversation. R. 90-93. 
28. Ms. Tanner said that she could see the person who walked in the room, and 
thought she knew who it was, but she ended up being wrong about who the person 
was. R. 97:19-23. 
29. Mr. Record also testified that he and Ms. Tanner had a business-related 
conversation while she was taking a break in the file room, which she often did. 
R. 104:37-106:39. He said he could not see the person who entered the room to 
identify who it was. R. 108:11-22. 
30. Ms. Tanner testified that when she was terminated, she was not told what the 
allegations against her were, so she could not refute them. R. 95:26-96:15. 
31. When asked if there was anything she "could have done to have allayed the 
Employer's concerns to have prevented your discharge," she responded, "There's 
nothing I could have done because they wouldn't give me any information, Your 
Honor. If they would have told me what the allegation was, or they would have . . 
. given me any information, then I could have refuted it or I could have explained 
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it, or I could, you know, I could have said something, but I was never told." R. 
95:17-24. 
32. Ms. Tanner intended to call three witnesses "to testify that basically we weren't 
meeting behind closed doors and that sort of thing." R. 110:38-42. 
33. The ALJ determined that he did not need testimony from those individuals since 
he had un-rebutted first-hand testimony from Ms. Tanner that she did not have 
closed-door meetings with Mr. Record. R. 111. 
34. The ALJ affirmed the initial decision of DWS denying benefits to Ms. Tanner. R. 
114-120. The ALJ relied on Ms. Hanson's account that she saw Ms. Tanner and 
Mr. Record partially clothed in the file room. R. 115. 
35. The ALJ found Ms. Hanson to be a more credible witness than Ms. Tanner for 
several reasons: 1) Ms. Hanson "is a disinterested party;" 2) he did not believe that 
someone who was going to meditate in a dark room would allow her coworker to 
disturb her with work related questions, particularly when she had been advised to 
avoid any semblance of unprofessional behavior with this coworker; and 3) he 
believed Ms. Tanner would have protested her termination and disputed that 
accusation against her at the time, rather than waiting until the unemployment 
hearing to do so. R. 118-119. 
36. The ALJ found that termination was necessary under the circumstances even 
though the incident was apparently an isolated one because Ms. Hanson testified 
"that she was genuinely shocked when she came across the Claimant and her 
coworker in the storage room, and the incident made her feel uncomfortable." He 
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found that because the Employer could be held liable for the working environment 
if it tolerated the conduct, "the element of culpability is present." R. 119. 
The ALJ found that because the Employer had previously advised Ms. Tanner "to 
avoid creating perceptions among other staff members that she had an 
inappropriate relationship with her coworker," the element of knowledge was 
established. R. 119. 
The ALJ stated that "Both the Claimant and her coworker testified the Claimant's 
discharge could have been avoided if they had not met under the circumstances 
where they were discovered by another member of the Employer's staff. Because 
the Claimant could have prevented [t]he discharge, the element of control is 
present." R. 119. 
Ms. Tanner filed an Appeal of ALJ Decision with the Appeals Unit. By that time, 
she had obtained photographs of the file room at issue, and she sought to introduce 
them as new evidence, and to have the Board either reverse the ALJ's decision, or 
remand the case for a new hearing to address the evidence. R. 127-137. Ms. 
Tanner's appeal included an explanation of how she obtained the photographs 
(through her attorney's demand to Zions after the company started dismantling the 
file room within days after she filed a lawsuit for defamation against Ms. Hanson). 
R. 128; 132-137. It also explained that Mr. Record is in one of the photographs, 
standing where he was when Ms. Hanson walked in the file room, and that the fact 
that he is not visible in the photograph meant that Ms. Hanson could not have seen 
what she claimed to have seen, and that moreover, the fact that shelves clearly 
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obstruct the view across the file room affect the credibility of Ms. Battista and Mr. 
Hinds, who both testified that one could see clearly across the room. R. 128-129. 
40. Ms. Tanner did not argue in her appeal that the employer was not harmed by her 
conduct. 
41. The Appeals Board affirmed the ALJ's decision, albeit on somewhat different 
grounds than the ALJ. The Board stated that it would not disturb the ALJ's 
credibility determination on appeal "unless there is a clear showing of error." R. 
141. The Board found there was evidence to support the ALJ's finding, and "no 
showing of error." R. 141. 
42. The Board found that Ms. Tanner knew that being partially clothed with a 
coworker was against the employer's rightful interest, and therefore the 
knowledge prong was established. It found that control was established because 
Ms. Tanner "had control over whether she took her pants down in the unused file 
room. She also had control over whether she arranged a meeting with Mr. Record 
in a dark, unused room." R. 142. 
43. The Board also apparently reviewed evidence presented in Mr. Record's 
unemployment hearing, as it stated in the decision, "Mr. Record testified in an 
earlier hearing that they chose the dimly lit, unused file room for this discussion 
because they had been warned about 'managing perceptions' in the workplace." 
R. 140. 
44. As to culpability, the Board stated, "The Claimant argues on appeal that the 
Employer was not harmed by his [sic] conduct." The Board stated that it 
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disagreed, and that the culpability prong was established. R. 143. (As stated 
above, Ms. Tanner did not argue that the employer was not harmed by her 
conduct.) 
45. The Board denied Ms. Tanner's request to introduce the photographs, citing due 
process concerns for the employer, and a desire for finality for the parties. R. 144. 
46. The Board also refused to allow the photographs because, "There is no record that 
the Claimant asked the Administrative Law Judge or the Employer for permission 
to enter the facility for the purpose of taking photographs. If she had asked, it is 
presumed that the Administrative Law Judge would have told the Employer to 
allow access or to provide the photographs as requested." R. 145. 
47. Finally, the Board stated that if it had allowed the photographs, "it would not have 
changed the Board's decision in this matter." The Board reasoned that because 
Ms. Tanner had testified that she could tell the person that entered the room was a 
woman, "it is not unreasonable to believe that Ms. Hanson could see the Claimant 
and Mr. Record." R. 145. 
48. Although Ms. Tanner had explained in her appeal that the photograph was taken 
while Mr. Record stood in the back corner of the room, and proved that Ms. 
Hanson could not have seen Ms. Tanner, the Board disagreed, stating, "If that is 
true, the Claimant fails to explain how she could see Ms. Hanson. It appears that 
the reason is that since the shelves are all aligned at the same heights, one could 
just look through the shelves to see the other side of the room." R. 146. 
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49. Ms. Tanner filed a Request for Reconsideration with the Board. R. 151-162. In it, 
she argued that both she and Mr. Record had asked their ALJs for assistance in 
obtaining documents to support their claims, but that the ALJs had told them that 
since Zions had the burden of proof, they did not need to supply documentation. 
R. 153. In support of this, she attached her own Declaration, as well as one from 
Mr. Record that included email correspondences between him and the ALJ in his 
case and Ms. Battista, in which the ALJ denied him the opportunity to obtain 
documents he requested from Zions (Ms. Tanner's Declaration in support of this 
claim is omitted from the record, although Mr. Record's Declaration is included at 
R. 159-162.) Ms. Tanner also argued that the Board's argument that if Ms. Tanner 
could see Ms. Hanson, then Ms. Hanson could see Ms. Tanner was logically 
flawed, based on the principle of, for instance, a peephole in a door, in which one 
party behind an object can see a person on the other side, but not visa versa. R. 
155-157. Moreover, she argued that the Board's finding that the shelves were all 
aligned was an inappropriate factual finding for it to make, as well as being 
incorrect. R. 155. 
50. The Board denied Ms. Tanner's Request for Reconsideration, without providing 
any reasoning. R. 167. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Board has the ability to consider new evidence on appeal, in certain 
circumstances. The Rule at issue states, "Absent a showing of unusual or extraordinary 
circumstances, the Board will not consider new evidence on appeal if the evidence was 
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reasonably available and accessible at the time of the hearing before the ALJ." R994-
508-305. 
Assuming this Rule is not simply theoretical, and that there are some 
circumstances under which the Board can and should consider new evidence, the Board 
should have considered the photographs on appeal in this case. It is difficult to imagine a 
situation that fits the requirements of "unusual or extraordinary circumstances" and 
evidence that was unavailable at the hearing better than this one. 
The Board found that the photographs would not have changed the Board's 
decision because Ms. Hanson could see Ms. Tanner if Ms. Tanner could see Ms. Hanson, 
and the shelves were all at the same height. This is a factual determination that is not 
supported by the record. The fact is that the photograph is objective evidence of how the 
room looked to Ms. Hanson, and Mr. Record is in fact in the very spot where he was 
when Ms. Hanson walked in, but he is not visible. Moreover, the photograph casts doubt 
on the credibility of Zions' other witnesses who testified that one could see clearly across 
the room through the shelving. Because Ms. Tanner obtained this evidence after the 
hearing, and this evidence proves that she was wrongfully terminated, the Court of 
Appeals should reverse the Board's denial of benefits to Ms. Tanner or remand her case 
for a hearing on the new evidence. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE BOARD ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE PHOTOGRAPHS ON 
APPEAL 
The Department of Workforce Services' administrative rules state that f,[a]bsent a 
showing of unusual or extraordinary circumstances, the Board will not consider new 
evidence on appeal if the evidence was reasonably available and accessible at the time of 
the hearing before the ALJ." Lopez v. Workforce Appeals Board, et al, 2006 UT App. 411 
(Utah App. 2006), citing Utah Admin. Code R994-508-305(2) (2005). 
There is no case law, it seems, to provide guidance as to when the Board shall 
consider new evidence, but this Rule implicitly, if not explicitly, provides that there are 
circumstances in which it is appropriate for the Board to consider new evidence. The 
Rule limits these circumstances to those that are unusual or extraordinary circumstances, 
and where the evidence at issue was not available during the hearing. It is difficult to 
imagine what might qualify as an unusual or extraordinary circumstance if not the one 
presented by this case. (It bears mentioning that the Board actually did review additional 
evidence in making its decision, as it referred to testimony in Mr. Record's 
unemployment hearing. R. 140.) Here, Ms. Tanner did not know the specific allegations 
for which she was terminated until she filed for unemployment benefits; she only knew 
that there was an issue regarding her being in the file room with Mr. Record, which did 
not make sense to her. At the unemployment hearing, Ms. Hanson did not dispute that 
Mr. Record and Ms. Tanner were in the back corner of the file room at issue, but she 
testified that she could see clearly to where Mr. Record and Ms. Tanner were in the room, 
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and that she saw them trying to put their clothes back on. Ms. Battista and Mr. Hinds 
also testified that one could see clearly from the doorway of the file room to the back 
corner of the room. Ms. Tanner could not have expected this testimony and/or the 
significance of it in the ultimate decision in this case. 
After the unemployment hearing, Ms. Tanner sued Brandy Hanson for defamation. 
Only then, through her attorney, did Ms. Tanner gain access to the file room at Zions 
where the incident at issue took place to take photographs of it. The photographs provide 
objective evidence to show that the view from the doorway of the room to the back 
corner was obstructed by shelving, which is obviously crucial issue to this proceeding, 
because it was the only way for her to prove that Ms. Hanson could not have seen what 
she claimed to have seen. If the Rule allowing new evidence to be reviewed in unusual 
circumstances is to have any true usefulness at all, it should be applied in this case to 
allow the new photographic evidence to be introduced in light of these unusual 
circumstances. 
The Board did not consider whether this was an unusual circumstance that merited 
considering new evidence. Rather, the Board refused to consider the evidence on the 
basis that it determined, without relying on any specific evidence, that Ms. Tanner should 
have gotten photographs before the hearing. This speaks to the second criteria presented 
by the Rule regarding considering new evidence, as the Rule provides that new evidence 
will not be considered if it was "reasonably available and accessible" during the hearing 
before the ALJ. Here, the photographic evidence simply did not exist at the time of the 
hearing, so it obviously was not available or accessible. It also was not foreseeable that 
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photographic evidence would be necessary to prove the point. Ms. Tanner raised the 
issue regarding the visibility from the doorway to where she and Mr. Record were 
talking, and submitted a diagram that showed the shelving between the two locations, but 
Ms. Hanson insisted that she could see clearly, and Ms. Battista and Mr. Hinds supported 
that testimony. It is not reasonable to suggest that Ms. Tanner should have foreseen that 
three witnesses would testify that one could see clearly from the doorway of the room to 
the back corner when that was clearly not true. Moreover, the circumstances under which 
Ms. Tanner did obtain the photographs (through a demand by her attorney), along with a 
common sense understanding of the relationship between employers and former 
employees, suggest Zions would not have simply allowed Ms. Tanner to come film its 
premises. It is therefore not reasonable for the Board to suggest that Ms. Tanner should 
have foreseen the need for photographic evidence of the visibility of certain areas of the 
file room and have taken steps to obtain that evidence. 
It should be pointed out that the Board had several options regarding what to do 
with the photographic evidence. The Board may affirm, reverse, modify, or remand a 
case to an ALJ. See Utah Code Ann. § 35A-l-304(2)(a)-(c) (2001). Accordingly, if the 
Board was concerned about the due process rights of Zions in addressing the evidence, it 
could simply have remanded the case for an additional hearing to address the issue. It is 
difficult to imagine that this would prejudice Zions in any way, particularly when 
weighed against the interests of justice. 
In refusing to consider the photographs or to remand the case, the Board reasoned, 
"Parties to a lawsuit or administrative procedure have the right to know that the dispute 
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will reach finality at some point in time." R. 144. The Court must keep in mind that at 
issue here are unemployment benefits, entitlements provided by the state, to which 
citizens have due process rights. Nelson v. Dept. of Employment Sec, 801 P.2d 158, 163-
163 (Utah App. 1990). As a comparison, while this brief was being drafted, Cornelius 
Dupree, Jr. was exonerated through DNA testing after spending 30 years in prison in 
Texas. In such a case, it would have been unconscionable, and absurd, for the judicial 
system to have refused to consider the DNA evidence that exonerated him because the 
parties needed finality. This is because the state has an obligation to its citizens to get it 
right when the evidence exists to correct a prior incorrect decision affecting rights or 
entitlements based on conjecture or, as in both these cases, faulty eye witness accounts. 
While there are obvious differences between the right to be released from prison and the 
right to unemployment benefits, the importance of the latter should not be underestimated 
here. To someone like Ms. Tanner, a single mother terminated during a recession, 
unemployment benefits are a lifeline to which she is entitled, and any interest the parties 
have in "finality" should not override the importance in making sure that the decision is 
overturned when new evidence is discovered that objectively shows that the decision was 
incorrect. This is exactly the type of "substantial prejudice" that the Court of Appeals is 
authorized to correct pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4). 
II. THE BOARD ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PHOTOGRAPHS 
WOULD NOT CHANGE THE OUTCOME OF THE DECISION 
Ms. Tanner submits that the photographs present evidence that is clear enough and 
strong enough to warrant a reversal of the ALJ's decision, without providing a new 
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hearing. The ALJ determined that Ms. Tanner had her pants down when Ms. Hanson 
entered the file room on February 19, 2010. The only competent evidence of this was 
Ms. Hanson, who testified that she could see clearly across the room. The photographs 
demonstrate that Ms. Hanson's claim as to the unobstructed view is patently false, and 
therefore, given that it is the employer's burden to show that the employee engaged in 
wrongful conduct, this Court need go no further than to determine that Zions cannot meet 
this burden because Ms. Hanson did not have a clear view across the room. When 
viewed in its totality, the evidence (including the photographs) does not support the 
ALJ's determination as to credibility or the events for which Ms. Tanner was terminated. 
Accordingly, the Board's decision should be reversed. Eagala, Inc. v. Department of 
Workforce Services, et al, 2007 UT App 43 (Utah App. 2007). 
The Board's determination that the photographs would not affect the outcome of 
this case is simply inexplicable. The Board noted that Ms. Tanner stated that when she 
took the photograph she submitted, Mr. Record was standing where he was when she and 
he were talking on February 19. As Mr. Record was not visible in the photograph, or to 
Ms. Tanner as she was taking the photograph, Ms. Tanner stated in her supporting 
declaration that the photograph showed Ms. Hanson could not have seen what she 
claimed to have seen. The Board simply disregarded the objective evidence presented by 
the photograph and Ms. Tanner's explanation of it, and decided, "If that is true, the 
Claimant fails to explain how she could see Ms. Hanson. It appears that the reason is that 
since the shelves are all aligned at the same heights, one could just look through the 
shelves to see to the other side of the room." The Board's reasoning, however, is faulty 
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for many reasons. As should be obvious to anyone who has looked through a peephole, 
the fact that Ms. Tanner could see Ms. Hanson (albeit not well enough to identify her) 
does not mean that Ms. Hanson could see Ms. Tanner. This theory is consistent in this 
situation where Ms. Hanson testified that she stood in the doorway (as opposed to peering 
through shelves), and did not bend down. She claimed to have seen bare legs, which 
would mean that she was necessarily looking at a downward angle, and the photograph 
makes clear that visibility through the three sets of shelves at that angle would have been 
impossible. 
Furthermore, the Board's conclusion that Ms. Tanner could see Ms. Hanson and 
visa versa because all of the shelves are aligned at the same height is also flawed. The 
conclusion that all of the shelves are at the same height is a finding of fact that is 
inappropriate for the Board to make without any evidence to support it. At any rate, 
regardless of the height of the shelves, the photographs make clear that one cannot see 
clearly from the doorway to the back corner of the file room, which should be sufficient 
to cast doubt on Ms. Hanson's credibility, thereby showing that Zions did not meet its 
burden of proof. The photographs make clear that Ms. Battista's and Mr. Hind's 
testimony that one could see clearly across the room from the doorway to the back comer 
is not true. This clear weakness in the credibility of these two witnesses carries a great 
deal of weight: why on earth would Mr. Hinds and Ms. Battista lie about such a thing 
after they acknowledged going to the file room to check the view for themselves? The 
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only logical answer is that the truth would not benefit Zions, and this objectively proven 
hole in their story should be an indication that Zions could not carry its burden of proof. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Tanner respectfully requests that the decisions of 
the ALJ and the Workforce Appeals Board be reversed and Ms. Tanner be awarded 
unemployment benefits. In the alternative, she requests that this case be remanded for an 
additional hearing to address the new evidence. 
DATED this 5th day of January, 2011. 
HOLLINGSWORTH LAW OFFICE, LLC 
> ^ 1 
April L. Hollingsworth 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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Workforce Appeals Board, 
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P.O. Box 45244 
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APPEAL DECISION: 
CASE HISTORY: 
Original Hearing Date: 
Date of Appeal Decision: 
Request for Reopening Dated: 
Appearances: 
Issues to be Decided: 
The request to reopen the hearing is granted. 
Benefits are denied. 
The Employer is relieved of charges. 
April 15, 2010 
April 15, 2010 
April 15, 2010 
Claimant / Employer 
R994-508-117 and R994-508-118 - Failure to Appear 
35A-4-405(2)(a) - Discharge 
35A-4-307 - Employer Charges 
The original Department decision denied unemployment insurance benefits on the grounds the Claimant was 
discharge for just cause by the Employer. That decision also relieved the Employer's benefit ratio account 
for benefits paid to the Claimant. 
APPEAL RIGHTS: The following decision will become final unless, within 30 days from May 10,2010, 
further written appeal is received by the Workforce Appeals Board (PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City, UT 
84145-0244; FAX 801-526-9244; or online at http://www.jobs.utah.gov/appeals) setting forth the grounds 
upon which the appeal is made. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Failure to Appear 
The Claimant appealed the Department decision denying her claim for unemployment insurance benefits, 
and a hearing was scheduled for April 15,2010. The Claimant provided the Department of a number where 
Emilie Tanner - 2 - 10-A-06015-R 
she could be reached for the hearing; however, this number was not accurately recorded for the docket 
information used by the Administrative Law Judge. As a result, the Administrative Law Judge was unable 
to reach the Claimant at the time the hearing was scheduled to occur, and the hearing was canceled. 
The Claimant contacted the Department shortly after the hearing was canceled, and it was discovered that 
the Department had incorrectly entered the Claimant's information into the docket record. The Claimant was 
advised to request a reopening in order for another hearing to be scheduled. The Claimant submitted a 
request to reopen the hearing on April 15, 2010, and another hearing was scheduled. 
Discharge 
The Claimant filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits on February 26, 2010, after she was 
discharged by Zions First National Bank. The Claimant worked for this Employer from January 25, 1993, 
until February 22, 2010. Prior to her discharge the Claimant worked as a lending supervisor and was 
responsible for researching titles on vehicles the Employer financed for its customers. The Employer's 
reason for discharging the Claimant is described below. 
During the summer of 2009, the Employer's human resources office received complaints regarding 
allegations of the Claimant's inappropriate relationship with a coworker. These complaints culminated in 
an anonymous call made to a third-party employee resource center which was forwarded to the Employer's 
human resources office. The anonymous call described a romantic relationship between the Claimant and 
her coworker that the caller felt had become disruptive to the Employer's workplace. A member of the 
Employer's human resources staff contacted the Claimant and arranged a meeting where the concerns raised 
by the complaints and anonymous call could be addressed. During this meeting, the Claimant denied 
anything other than a professional working relationship with her coworker. However, due to the nature of 
the complaints, the Claimant was advised to refrain from any behavior involving her coworker which could 
be construed as inappropriate by other staff members. 
On February 19,2010, the Claimant and her coworker were observed in a dark, disused storage room in the 
Employer's building. A member of the Employer's staff stepped into the room to blow her nose. When this 
staff member heard noise at the back of the storage room, she turned on the lights and saw the Claimant and 
her coworker in the back corner of the storage room. The staff member could see that the Claimant and her 
coworker were partially clothed when both suddenly stood up after she turned on the lights. After seeing 
the Claimant and her coworker, the staff member turned off the lights and walked away from the doorway. 
The staff member waited to see who would come out of the room and observed the Claimant's coworker, 
and then the Claimant leave the room. 
The staff member reported this incident to her supervisor, who then advised the Employer's executive vice 
president about the incident. After interviewing the staff member who observed the Claimant and her 
coworker, the executive vice president met with the Claimant. The executive vice president asked the 
Claimant if she thought it was appropriate for her to be in a dark room with a married coworker. The 
respondent answered, "no." The executive vice president considered the Claimant's response as an 
indication of her acknowledging the incident had occurred, and immediately suspended the Claimant. 
The executive vice president contacted the Employer's human resources office, which in turn contacted the 
Employer's legal counsel. Based upon the staff member's description of the Claimant and her coworker 
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partially clothed in a dark storage room, the Employer determined the Claimant's actions were highly 
inappropriate and disruptive. Consequently, the Employer decided to discharge the Claimant, and 
announced its decision to her when she was called in to work on February 22, 2010. 
REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Failure to Appear 
The Unemployment Insurance Rules pertaining to Section 35A-4-406(3) of the Utah Employment Security 
Act provide, in pertinent part: 
R994-508-117. Failure to Participate in the Hearing and Reopening the Hearing 
After the Hearing Has Been Concluded. 
(1) If a party fails to appear for or participate in the hearing, either personally or through 
a representative, the ALJ may take evidence from participating parties and will issue a 
decision based on the best available evidence. 
(2) Any party failing to participate, personally or through a representative, may request 
that the hearing be reopened. 
(3) The request must be in writing, must set forth the reason for the request, and must be 
mailed, faxed, or delivered to the Appeals Unit within ten days of the issuance of the 
decision issued under Subsection (1). Intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays 
are excluded from the computation of the ten days in accordance with Rule 6 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. If the request is made after the expiration of the ten-day time limit, 
but within 30 days, the party requesting reopening must show cause for not making the 
request within ten days. If no decision has yet been issued, the request should be made 
without unnecessary delay. If the request is received more than 30 days after the decision is 
issued, the Department will have lost jurisdiction and the party requesting reopening must 
show good cause for not making a timely request. . . 
(5) The ALJ may reopen a hearing on his or her own motion if it appears necessary to 
take continuing jurisdiction or if the failure to reopen would be an affront to fairness. 
R994-508-118. What Constitutes Grounds to Reopen a Hearing. 
(1) The request to reopen will be granted if the party was prevented from appearing at 
the hearing due to circumstances beyond the party's control. 
(2) The request may be granted upon such terms as are just for any of the following 
reasons: mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the decision. The determination of what sorts of neglect will be 
considered excusable is an equitable one, taking into account all of the relevant 
circumstances including: 
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(a) the danger that the party not requesting reopening will be harmed by 
reopening; 
(b) the length of the delay caused by the party's failure to participate including the 
length of time to request reopening; 
(c) the reason for the request including whether it was within the reasonable 
control of the party requesting reopening; 
(d) whether the party requesting reopening acted in good faith; 
(e) whether the party was represented at the time of the hearing. Attorneys and 
professional representatives are expected to have greater knowledge of Department 
procedures and rules and are therefore held to a higher standard; and 
(f) whether based on the evidence of record and the parties' arguments or 
statements, taking additional evidence might effect the outcome of the case. 
(3) Requests to reopen are remedial in nature and thus must be liberally construed in 
favor of providing parties with an opportunity to be heard and present their case. Any doubt 
must be resolved in favor of granting reopening. 
(4) Excusable neglect is not limited to cases where the failure to act was due to 
circumstances beyond the party's control. 
(5) The ALJ has the discretion to schedule a hearing to determine if a party requesting 
reopening satisfied the requirements of this rule or may, after giving the other parties an 
opportunity to respond to the request, grant or deny the request on the basis of the record in 
the case. 
In this case the Administrative Law Judge finds that the facts warrant a reopening of the hearing to allow 
all parties the opportunity to be heard, and the failure to participate in the hearing was caused by an error 
on the part of the Department which was beyond the ability of the Claimant to control. 
Discharge 
In order for a determination to be made that the Claimant's separation from Employment was disqualifying, 
the Employer must establish that its decision to end the Claimant's employment was made for just cause. 
Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act explains: 
R994-405-201. Discharge - General Definition. 
A separation is a discharge if the employer was the moving party in determining the date the 
employment ended. Benefits will be denied if the claimant was discharged for just cause or 
for an act or omission in connection with employment, not constituting a crime, which was 
deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest. 
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For an employer to establish just cause for discharge pursuant to Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) 
of the Utah Employment Security Act, there must be fault on the part of the employee 
involved. The elements of just cause as established by Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act are described in the following terms: 
(a) Culpability. The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the 
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest... 
(b) Knowledge. The worker must have had a knowledge of the conduct which the 
employer expected... 
(c) Control. The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimant's 
control... 
The Employer arranged for the staff member who observed the Claimant and her coworker in the darkened 
storage room to participate as a witness for the hearing. Both the Claimant, and the Claimant's coworker 
who was involved in the incident that led to the Claimant's discharge were present during the hearing, and 
offered testimony that differed from the description of events provided by the Employer's witness. In 
hearings where conflicting testimony is offered by opposing parties, it is necessary to determine which party 
offered the most credible testimony. In this case, the Administrative Law Judge finds the testimony offered 
by the Employer's witness to be more credible than the Claimant's testimony. This credibility decision is 
made for the following reasons; 
It is important to note that the Employer's witness is a disinterested party whose own well-being is not 
affected by the outcome of a decision to allow unemployment insurance benefits or to charge the Employer's 
benefit account. Moreover, no testimony or evidence were provided during the hearing to establish the 
Employer's witness benefitted somehow from the Employer's decision to discharge the Claimant or her 
coworker. Both the Claimant and her coworker would benefit from denying the incident took place in order 
to preserve their own reputation, and importantly, to prove the Employer did not have just cause for ending 
their employment. 
Another point of consideration is the validity of the explanation given by her Claimant and her coworker 
to describe why they were both in a dark, unused storage room on a floor of the Employer's building where 
neither worked. The Claimant testified she went to the room to meditate in the dark. The Claimant's 
coworker testified he had questions about a procedure the Claimant had developed which he posed shortly 
before the Claimant took her break. If the Claimant truly intended to meditate in a dark room during her 
break, a question is raised as to why she would allow her coworker to disturb her with questions about the 
Employer's procedures involving financial transactions, rather than telling her coworker she would answer 
his questions after she finished meditating. This question is further complicated by the previous advice 
given to the Claimant from the Employer's human resources office to avoid any semblance of unprofessional 
behavior toward this particular coworker. It is unclear why the Claimant would place herself in a situation 
which would further fuel speculation about an inappropriate relationship with her coworker, when she had 
been advised to avoid such situations by the human resources office. 
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Lastly, the Claimant's testimony describing her initial response to the Employer's accusations is 
uncharacteristic of the response expected if an unfounded accusation had been made. The Claimant testified 
she felt intimidated by the vice president's line of questioning, and immediately left the Employer's building 
without any protest. If the Claimant truly felt the Employer's accusations were baseless, she would have 
disputed the accusation at the time it was made, rather than denying the incident occurred during an 
unemployment insurance hearing. 
When comparing the testimony offered by the Employer's witness with the testimony offered by the 
Claimant and her coworker, the Administrative Law Judge finds the Claimant and her coworker were 
engaging in improper behavior in the Employer's building during office hours, and will consider whether 
the Employer had just cause for discharging the Claimant in response to this behavior. 
The Employer's decision to discharge the Claimant was based upon an isolated incident involving 
inappropriate behavior in the Employer's workplace. It is important to consider whether the misconduct was 
simply an "isolated incident of poor judgment," and thus not culpable conduct. As an isolated incident, it 
is necessary to balance the employee's "longevity and prior work record" against the seriousness of the 
offense and how likely it is to be repeated. "The proper emphasis under the culpability requirement should 
not be upon the number of violations; rather, it should address the problem of whether the discharge was 
'necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to the employer's rightful interest.'" Bhatia v. Dept. of 
Employment Sec, 834 P.2d 574, 578 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)(citations omitted). 
In this case, another staff member observed the Claimant and her coworker partially undressed in a storage 
room. If the Employer were to tolerate the Claimant's behavior, the Employer could be held liable for 
allowing an inhospitable work environment. The staff member who testified during the hearing expressed 
that she was genuinely shocked when she came across the Claimant and her coworker in the storage room, 
and the incident made her feel uncomfortable. Because the Employer would eventually be held liable for 
creating an uncomfortable working environment if it tolerated the Claimant's actions, it had no choice other 
than to discharge the Claimant to avoid potential harm. Based on this reasoning, the element of culpability 
is present. 
The Employer previously advised the Claimant to avoid creating perceptions among other staff members 
that she had an inappropriate relationship with her coworker. Meeting with this coworker in a dark room 
in an area where neither she nor her coworker worked, clearly ran counter to the advice she had been given. 
The element of knowledge has been shown because the Employer gave the Claimant clear instructions to 
avoid the kind of situation that led to her discharge. 
Both the Claimant and her coworker testified the Claimant's discharge could have been avoided if they had 
not met under the circumstances where they were discovered by another member of the Employer's staff. 
Because the Claimant could have prevented he discharge, the element of control is present. 
Based upon a preponderance of the evidence, the Employer has proven it had just cause for discharging the 
Claimant; therefore, the nature of the Claimant's separation from employment would disqualify her from 
receiving unemployment insurance benefits. 
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Employer Charges 
An employer may be relieved of charges when the claimant was separated from employment for reasons 
which would have resulted in a denial of benefits under Section 35A-4-405(l) or Section 35A-4-405(2) of 
the Act. In this case the reason for the Claimant's separation is disqualifying; therefore, the Employer is 
relieved of charges. 
DECISION AND ORDER: 
Failure to Appear 
The request for reopening of the hearing is allowed in accordance with provisions of Paragraphs R994-508-
117 and R994-508-118 of the Unemployment Insurance Rules for Section 35A-4-406(3) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act. 
Discharge 
The Department decision denying the payment of unemployment insurance benefits pursuant to Section 
35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act is affirmed. Benefits are denied effective 
February 21, 2010, and until the Claimant has worked and earned at least six times her weekly benefit 
amount in bona fide covered employment and is otherwise eligible. 
Employer Charges 
The Employer is relieved of liability for charges in connection with this claim, as provided by Section 35A-
4-307 of the Utah Employment Security Act. 
Scott Spri 
Administrative Law Judge 
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES 
Issued: May 10, 2010 
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HISTORY OF CASE: 
In a decision dated May 10,2010, Case No. 10-A-06015-R, the Administrative Law Judge affirmed 
the Department decision and denied unemployment insurance benefits to the Claimant effective 
February 21, 2010. The Employer, Zions First National Bank, was eligible for relief of benefit 
charges in connection with this claim. 
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD: 
The Workforce Appeals Board has authority to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision 
pursuant to §35A-4-508(4) and (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Utah 
Administrative Code (1997) pertaining thereto. 
CLAIMANT APPEAL FILED: June 7, 2010. 
ISSUES BEFORE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD AND APPLICABLE PROVISIONS 
OF UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT: 
1. Did the Employer have just cause for discharging the Claimant pursuant to the provisions of 
§35A-4-405(2)(a)? 
2. Is the Employer eligible for relief of charges pursuant to the provisions of §35 A-4-307(l)? 
FACTUAL FINDINGS: 
The Workforce Appeals Board adopts in full the factual findings of the Administrative Law Judge. 
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REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The Claimant worked for the employer for 17 years. At the time of her discharge, she was a lending 
supervisor. She was discharged for inappropriate conduct at the workplace. The Department and 
the Administrative Law Judge denied benefits and the Claimant filed this appeal. 
An employee of the Employer company, Brandy Hanson, went into an unused file room on 
February 19, 2010. She had a cold and wanted to step away from the work area to blow her nose. 
The unused file room was described as a rather large room and had "security lights" which provided 
only dim lighting to the room. The door to the room is always left open and was open on this day. 
Ms. Hanson testified that she heard a rustling in the room so she turned on the overhead lights. She 
testified she saw the Claimant and another employee, Jeffrey Record, in the back corner of the room. 
She testified Mr. Record was sitting on a chair or on a cart and the Claimant was sitting on his lap. 
As soon as the lights went on, Ms. Hanson testified, the Claimant and Mr. Record jumped to their 
feet and started pulling up their pants. Ms. Hanson immediately turned out the light and left the 
room. Ms. Hanson testified that she identified the two parties involved but waited outside the room 
until the two left the room to make sure it was who she thought it was. Ms. Hanson reported the 
incident to her supervisor. The Claimant and Mr. Record were discharged as a result of the incident. 
The Claimant testified that Mr. Record contacted her to ask her about a work issue. The Claimant 
testified she was on her way to the unused file room to meditate during her break. She testified she 
told Mr. Record he could join here there during her break to discuss the work issue. The Claimant 
and Mr. Record testified in an earlier hearing that they chose the dimly lit, unused file room for this 
discussion because they had been warned about "managing perceptions" in the workplace. The 
Claimant testified, during this hearing, that she often went to the unused file room during her break 
to meditate. 
Other employees had complained to management that the Claimant and Mr. Record were suspected 
of having an affair. The Claimant had been told that what she did in her private life was her business 
but in light of the complaints, she needed to "manage the perception" that she and Mr. Record were 
engaging in inappropriate conduct. 
The Claimant and Mr. Record testified that they were in the unused file room when Ms. Hanson 
turned on the light. While the Claimant argued during the hearing, and again on appeal, that 
Ms. Hanson could not have seen the couple in the corner because of the shelving, the Claimant 
admitted that she was able to see Ms. Hanson when the light was turned on. Both the Claimant and 
Mr. Record denied they had their pants down or that anything improper occurred in the room. 
Unemployment insurance hearings, like many adversarial hearings, involve two or more opposing 
parties who purport to have the only accurate version of events, yet whose stories differ-sometimes 
significantly. For this reason, a judge is tasked with the responsibility to hear testimony, consider 
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evidence, and then determine which party is most credible; in other words, determine which version 
of events is most likely true. Since the Administrative Law Judge is in the unique position of being 
an active participant in the hearing, interacting with the parties and also questioning the witnesses, 
the Administrative Law Judge's credibility finding will not be disturbed on appeal. If there is 
evidence in the record to support the credibility finding made by the Administrative Law Judge, the 
Board will not substitute its own judgment for that of the Judge unless there is a clear showing of 
error. 
Here the Administrative Law Judge found that the Employer's witnesses were more credible than the 
Claimant and her witness. There is ample evidence in the record to support that finding. The 
Claimant and Mr. Record admitted being in an unused, dimly lit room after having been told to 
"manage perceptions." While the Claimant explained that Mr. Record wanted to discuss a business 
issue with her, she did not explain why she needed to meet with him in person to discuss this issue 
and why they did not discuss it via email or telephone. The perception the parties were trying to 
manage was not well-served by agreeing to meet in a dark, unused file room. Finally, the Claimant 
did not provide convincing evidence that Ms. Hanson had a reason to lie about what she saw. The 
credibility determination is upheld. There is no showing of error. 
Department rules provide: 
R994-405-202. Just Cause. 
To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the following three elements 
must be satisfied: 
(1) Culpability. 
The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the 
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If the 
conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no expectation it 
would be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be shown. The claimant's 
prior work record is an important factor in determining whether the conduct was an 
isolated incident or a good faith error in judgment. An employer might not be able 
to demonstrate that a single violation, even though harmful, would be repeated by a 
long-term employee with an established pattern of complying with the employer's 
rules In this instance, depending on the seriousness of the conduct, it may not be 
necessary for the employer to discharge the claimant to avoid future harm. 
(2) Knowledge. 
The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer 
expected. There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the 
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employer; however, it must be shown the claimant should have been able to 
anticipate the negative effect of the conduct. Generally, knowledge may not be 
established unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or 
had a written policy, except in the case of a violation of a universal standard of 
conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the claimant had knowledge of the 
expected conduct. After a warning the claimant should have been given an 
opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer had a progressive 
disciplinary procedure in place at the time of the separation, it generally must have 
been followed for knowledge to be established, except in the case of very severe 
infractions, including criminal actions. 
(3) Control. 
(a) The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the 
claimant's control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment 
are not sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued 
inefficiency, repeated carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected of a 
reasonable person in a similar circumstance may satisfy the element of control if the 
claimant had the ability to perform satisfactorily. 
(b) The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may 
be necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards. While 
such a circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not mean benefits 
will be denied. To satisfy the element of control in cases involving a discharge due 
to unsatisfactory work performance, it must be shown the claimant had the ability to 
perform the job duties in a satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made a 
good faith effort to meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to a lack of skill 
or ability and a discharge results, just cause is not established. 
The Claimant knew, or should have known, that being partially clothed in a dimly lit, unused room 
with another employee during work hours was against the Employer's rightful interest. It is 
understood that the Claimant vehemently denies that she and Mr. Record were touching or had their 
pants down, but the Administrative Law Judge found she did and the Board will not disturb that 
finding. The Claimant had been told that she was to "manage the perception" that she and 
Mr. Record, a married man, were having an affair. The knowledge prong of the just cause test was 
proved. 
The Claimant had control over whether she took her pants down in the unused file room. She also 
had control over whether she arranged a meeting with Mr. Record in a dark, unused room. The 
control element was proved. 
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The Claimant argues on appeal that the Employer was not harmed by his conduct. The Board 
disagrees. Employers have a legal duty to keep the workplace free from conduct that will be 
offensive to other employees or make other employees uncomfortable. The Claimant's behavior did 
both of those things. The culpability prong of the just cause test was proved. 
The Claimant presented photographs of the unused file room for the first time on appeal. These 
photographs constitute new evidence on appeal. 
Prior to the hearing the parties were sent an appeal brochure explaining the hearing procedure. The 
brochure also advises parties on how to prepare for a hearing and says, in part: 
Preparation for the Hearing 
The hearing before the ALJ is your only chance to present everything relevant to the 
case. A record of the hearing will be made, and the ALJ may consider only the 
evidence introduced during this hearing. Further review and decisions on appeal are 
limited solely to the evidence introduced at this hearing. Take time to prepare for 
your hearing. Know the issue or issues involved. Obtain documents that help prove 
your facts and provide them to the ALJ and opposing party. Also, be sure to line up 
witnesses which support your side of the case. To help you remember what you want 
to present at the hearing, you may prepare a simple chart or written summary with the 
key information you want to present. 
Prepare all evidence and be ready to explain company records, abbreviations, 
technical terms, and/or symbols. Do not rely solely upon written statements of 
witnesses as part of your evidence presentation. (See Witnesses and Subpoenas.) 
Prepare Facts 
Facts, not conclusions, are the basis of a good case. Be prepared to answer the 
questions of who, what, when, where, and why. Saying that an employer is unfair or 
that an employee is unsatisfactory is a conclusion. Prepare facts that prove the point 
you wish to make, and present evidence and witnesses that will verify the facts 
asserted at the hearing. 
The notice of hearing which was sent to the parties also included the following instructions: 
ABOUT THE HEARING: The hearing is your opportunity to present ALL 
testimony and evidence on the issues. In the event of a further appeal, testimony and 
evidence that could have been presented at the original hearing may not be allowed. 
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DOCUMENTS: Enclosed are documents that may be made part of the hearing 
record.. . . 
If you have additional documents to be considered by the judge, you MUST mail, 
fax, or hand-deliver the documents to the judge and all other parties at least three 
days before the hearing.... 
Documents not provided in a timely manner may not be considered by the 
judge. 
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO THE HEARING, CALL 
THE APPEALS UNIT AT 801-526-9300 or 877-800-0671. [emphasis in original] 
The Administrative Law Judge also told the parties, at the beginning of the hearing, to be sure and 
present all the evidence the parties wanted to be considered during the hearing. 
Department rules provide: 
R994-508-305. Decisions of the Board. 
(2) Absent a showing of unusual or extraordinary circumstances, the 
Board will not consider new evidence on appeal if the evidence was reasonably 
available and accessible at the time of the hearing before the ALJ. 
The reason for this rule is that an appeal to the Board is an appeal on the record. That means that 
the Board reviews the evidence before the Administrative Law Judge and not new evidence. 
Providing evidence after the hearing deprives the other party of the opportunity to cross-examine 
witnesses and provide rebuttal evidence, if available. The right of cross-examination and the right 
to rebut evidence are important due process rights that must be protected. 
Courts and administrative bodies are charged with the responsibility of resolving disputes between 
individuals. Parties to a lawsuit or administrative procedure have the right to know that the dispute 
will reach finality at some point in time. To ensure that the rights of all parties are protected, courts 
and administrative bodies set trials and hearings so that the parties might fully present any and all 
evidence and arguments in support of their position. After the hearing or trial no new evidence can 
be accepted except under unusual circumstances, as explained in the rule mentioned above. 
Although the Board understands that to an inexperienced party the rules seem overly technical, those 
rules are necessary. Many, if not most, losing parties would want a new hearing to try and present 
A A O 
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a "better" case. If the Board granted those requests it would unnecessarily delay and burden the 
hearing process. 
Department rules provide: 
R994-403-116e. Eligibility Determinations: Obligation to Provide Information. 
(1) The Department cannot make proper determinations regarding 
eligibility unless the claimant and the employer provide correct information in a 
timely manner. Claimants and employers therefore have a continuing obligation to 
provide any and all information and verification which may affect eligibility. 
(2) Providing incomplete or incorrect information will be treated the same 
as a failure to provide information if the incorrect or insufficient information results 
in an improper decision with regard to the claimant's eligibility. 
R994-508-109. Hearing Procedures. 
(9) . . . A party has the responsibility to present all relevant evidence in its 
possession. When a party is in possession of evidence but fails to introduce the 
evidence, an inference may be drawn that the evidence does not support the party's 
position. 
The Claimant explained on appeal that she did not have access to the facility prior to the appeal and 
hence was unable to take or present the photographs during the hearing. There is no record that the 
Claimant asked the Administrative Law Judge or the Employer for permission to enter the facility 
for the purpose of taking photographs. If she had asked, it is presumed that the Administrative Law 
Judge would have told the Employer to allow access or to provide the photographs as requested. The 
problem with providing the photographs now is that the Employer's witnesses are not available at 
this point to evaluate the photographs and state whether the photos accurately represent the room at 
the time of the incident. The photograph was not used by the Board in making this decision, but had 
it been, it would not have changed the Board's decision in this matter. The Claimant admitted that 
she saw Ms. Hanson when the light was turned on. She testified that she thought it was another 
individual but she was able to see clearly enough to know it was a woman, and not a man. If the 
Claimant could see Ms. Hanson, it is not unreasonable to believe that Ms. Hanson could see the 
Claimant and Mr. Record. 
The Claimant argues on appeal that the photograph proves that someone standing where Ms. Hanson 
was could not have seen the Claimant or Mr. Record. The Claimant alleges that when the 
photograph was taken, the photographer was standing where Ms. Hanson testified she was standing 
-fi to k 
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and the Claimant was in the corner of the room where she agrees she was on February 19,2010. The 
Claimant alleges Ms. Hanson could not have seen her. If that is true, the Claimant fails to explain 
how she could see Ms. Hanson. It appears that the reason is that since the shelves are all aligned at 
the same heights, one could just look through the shelves to see to the other side of the room. 
The Claimant requests a new hearing to introduce the photograph into evidence to prove that 
Ms. Hanson could not have seen the Claimant. The request is denied. The Claimant could have 
obtained this photograph prior to the hearing. The Board will not allow the Claimant to re-litigate 
this case based on the photograph. The room was adequately described during the hearing. The 
photograph is not inconsistent with Ms. Hanson's testimony as it is apparent how Ms. Hanson could 
have seen to the back of the room. Finally, and again, the Claimant has not shown why she could 
see Ms. Hanson but Ms. Hanson could not see her. 
The Claimant argues on appeal that the Administrative Law Judge found that the Claimant would 
have acted differently, when she was sent home early on February 19,2010, if she had been innocent 
of the allegations. The Claimant had a discussion with the Employer's executive vice president, 
Mr. Hinds, shortly after the incident. The Administrative Law Judge states that Mr. Hinds asked the 
Claimant if she thought it was appropriate for her to be in a dark room with a married man. The 
Claimant answered "no" to the question. The Claimant argues on appeal that Mr. Hinds asked her 
"if it was inappropriate for a married man to be in a dark room with an unmarried female?" To 
which the Claimant answered "no." The discharge was based on the conduct in the file room, not 
what occurred in Mr. Hinds' office. Even if the Claimant told Mr. Hinds it was not inappropriate to 
be in a dark room with a married coworker, the Employer felt that it was under these circumstances. 
The Claimant had been warned about the mere appearance of impropriety. She should have known 
being in the back corner of a dimly lit, unused file room with Mr. Record was inappropriate. 
The Employer proved all the elements of just cause. The reasoning and conclusions of law of the 
Administrative Law Judge are adopted in full. 
DECISION: 
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge denying unemployment insurance benefits to the 
Claimant effective February 21, 2010, under the provisions of §35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act, is affirmed. 
The Employer, Zions First National Bank, is eligible for relief of benefit charges in connection with 
this claim as provided by §35A-4-307(l) of the Act. 
APPEAL RIGHTS: 
Pursuant to §63-46b-13(l)(a) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, you may request 
reconsideration of this decision within 20 days from the date this decision is issued. Your request 
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for reconsideration must be in writing and must state the specific grounds upon which relief is 
requested. The request must be filed with the Workforce Appeals Board at 140 East 300 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, or may be mailed to the Workforce Appeals Board at P.O. Box 45244, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244. A copy of the request for reconsideration must also be mailed to 
each party by the person making the request. If the Workforce Appeals Board does not issue an 
order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered 
to be denied pursuant to §63-46b-13(3)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. The filing 
of a request for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of this order. If a 
request for reconsideration is made, the Workforce Appeals Board will issue another decision. This 
decision will set forth the rights of further appeal to the Court of Appeals and time limitation for 
such an appeal. 
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in 
writing within 30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the 
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board, 
Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file 
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ 
of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act; §63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 
9 and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
WORJ£EORCE APPEALS BOARD 
Date Issued: July 14, 2010. 
TV/GE/RH/SS/SP/cd 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on 
this 14th day of July, 2010, by mailing the same, postage 
prepaid, United States mail to: 
APRIL L HOLLINGSWORTH 
HOLLINGSWORTH LAW OFFICE LLC 
1115S900E 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105 
EMILIE A TANNER 
7755 S 4950 W 
WEST JORDAN UT 84081-3616 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
% EMPLOYER ADVOCATES LLC 
PO BOX 25236 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84125-0236 
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EXHIBIT C 
Form BRDEC W O R K F O R C E A P P E A L S B O A R D 
issue 01 Department of Workforce Services 
Division of Adjudication 
EMILIE A. TANNER, CLAIMANT 
S.S.A. No. XXX-XX-2447 : 
Case No. 10-R-01013 
RECONSIDERATION 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, : 
EMPLOYER 
DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD: 
Claimant's request for reconsideration is denied. 
HISTORY OF CASE: 
In an appeal faxed August 3,2010, Claimant, Emilie A. Tanner, requested reconsideration of the decision of the 
Workforce Appeals Board issued in this case on July 14, 2010. The decision of the Workforce Appeals Board 
was based on a review of a decision of an Administrative Law Judge after a formal hearing. 
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD: 
The Board has jurisdiction to review the request for reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-
13(3) on the grounds that the Board's decision was final agency action within the meaning and intent of that 
section of law. 
DECISION: 
The Claimant's request for reconsideration is denied. The decision of the Workforce Appeals Board dated 
July 14, 2010, remains in effect. 
APPEAL RIGHTS: 
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in writing within 
30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the fifth floor of the Scott M. 
Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal 
must show the Workforce Appeals Board, Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the 
proceeding as Respondents. To file an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the 
Court a Petition for Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act; §63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9 and 
24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
W O R K F O R C E APPEALS BOARD 
Date Issued: August 24, 2010 
^vt 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on 
this 24th day of August, 2010, by mailing the same, postage 
prepaid, United States mail to: 
APRIL L HOLLINGSWORTH 
HOLLINGSWORTH LAW OFFICE LLC 
1115S900E 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105 
EMILIE A TANNER 
7755 S 4950 W 
WEST JORDAN UT 84081-3616 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
% EMPLOYER ADVOCATES LLC 
PO BOX 25236 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84125-0236 
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